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1.  Why Attractiveness to FDI Is Not Enough 
For FDI to help stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty in developing countries, two 
conditions have to be met. The first requirement is to improve developing countries' 
attractiveness to foreign investors. Second, the host-country environment in which foreign 
investors operate must be conducive to favorable FDI effects with regard to overall 
investment, economic spillovers and income growth. 
To a certain extent, these two requirements involve similar policy challenges for developing 
countries. The development of local markets and institutions, an investment-friendly policy 
and administrative framework, as well as the availability of local complementary factors of 
production can be considered major driving forces of FDI. Hence, better access to FDI 
depends on policy actions on all these fronts. At the same time, empirical studies strongly 
suggest that favorable effects of FDI in the host countries would be more likely if these 
factors figured high on the policy agenda. 
Nevertheless, policymakers should be aware that meeting the first condition, i.e., attracting 
FDI, is no guarantee for reaping benefits from FDI. For all we can tell, it appears much more 
difficult to benefit from FDI than to attract FDI.1 Resource-based countries with low per-
capita income frequently exemplify this dilemma. Many of these countries report fairly high 
FDI inflows, but the enclave character of FDI in commodity-related activities renders it 
unlikely that FDI contributes significantly to economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
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2.  Limitations of Targeted FDI Policies 
Against this backdrop, it has been suggested to policymakers in developing countries, e.g., by 
ECLAC (2003), to put more emphasis on the quality of inward FDI, rather than its quantity. 
Accordingly, policymakers should pursue a pro-active and targeted approach of encouraging 
FDI with the desired developmental impact. For several reasons, however, this is easier said 
than done. 
First of all, policymakers are constrained in pursuing selective FDI policies by various rules 
and obligations enshrined in BITs, FTAs and multilateral agreements (e.g., TRIMS). In other 
words, some policy tools are no longer available. Performance requirements provide a case in 
point. Formerly, many policymakers resorted to local-content requirements as a preferred 
means to foster linkages between foreign companies and local input suppliers (UNCTAD 
2001: 166). Local-content requirements are now banned by the TRIMS agreement. This may 
not cause any harm to developing countries, considering that local-content requirements and 
the implicit protection of inefficient local suppliers were often found to be ineffective and, 
sometimes, even counterproductive (Moran 1998). 
However, policymakers in developing countries have also tied their own hands in other 
respects, notably in BITs and FTAs with the United States, e.g., with regard to export 
performance requirements, the economic case for which tends to be stronger. Furthermore, 
while developing countries rejected the demand of industrialized countries to conclude a 
multilateral investment agreement under the roof of the WTO, for fears that such an 
agreement might have further eroded their flexibility in pursuing FDI policies, various 
developing countries did enter into FTAs containing FDI provisions that are more binding 
than anything that was to be expected from an MAI: 
•  For instance, the FTA concluded by Chile and the United States in 2002, and regarded by 
the latter to provide a model of "state of the art" FTAs, defines investment in broad terms 
and covers all governmental measures, at all levels of government, relating to investment 
in all sectors, including services. Foreign investors are granted freedom from performance 
requirements as a condition for the establishment or operation of an investment. The 
agreement also provides a mechanism for investors to pursue claims against host-country 
governments (investor-state dispute settlement).   3
•  Recent indications are that developing countries will have to agree to similarly strict 
obligations when negotiating FTAs and BITs with the EU. Most notably, the EU appears 
to be following the United States in pressing for pre-establishment rights in favor of 
European investors. 
Pro-active and targeted FDI policies are not only constrained by contractual obligations. At 
the same time, the effectiveness and efficiency of still existing policy options are sometimes 
highly questionable. This refers especially to incentives granted to foreign investors whose 
engagement is deemed by policymakers to have desirable developmental effects. 
Comprehensive statistics on the use and significance of FDI incentives do not exist. In recent 
years, however, few countries appear to have competed for FDI without any form of subsidies 
(UNCTAD 1998: 102–3). It would be good news if the policy of subsidizing FDI were to 
change, but this is unlikely to happen. 
Policymakers may have a point when dismissing the argument of many economists that FDI 
incentives are ineffective in increasing FDI inflows. Incentives can make a difference when it 
comes to an investor's final locational choice between short-listed countries with similar 
economic fundamentals (Oman 2001). FDI incentives may even be economically efficient to 
the extent that they bridge the possible gap between private returns to FDI and higher social 
returns (Blomström and Kokko 2003). 
Social returns may exceed private returns to FDI if the host country benefits from FDI-
induced spillovers, enhancing the productivity of local firms. However, "the elusive nature of 
spillovers makes it difficult to justify the use of investment incentives on the scale they are 
being used today" (Hoekman and Saggi 2000: 638). Spillovers cannot be taken for granted, 
and they are impossible to quantify (which would be required in order to get an idea on the 
appropriate amount of incentives). Moreover, the available evidence reveals that productivity-
enhancing spillovers materialize only if the host country has reached a threshold of sufficient 
local capabilities to absorb superior technologies and knowledge of foreign investors. 
This has obvious policy implications which are disliked, however, by policymakers in many 
developing countries. First, FDI incentives are no substitute for locational strengths related to 
economic and institutional fundamentals. Second, "to justify FDI incentives, there is a reason 
to simultaneously subsidize local firms to strengthen their capacity to absorb foreign 
technology and skills" (Blomström and Kokko 2003: 19). In this context, it may be noted that 
the Irish success story in attracting FDI and benefiting from FDI is at least partly because   4
various incentives, including low taxes, were made available to foreign and local investors 
alike. 
Stopping the "race to the top" in granting discretionary FDI incentives should figure high on 
the policy agenda. However, it is somewhat naive to call for a policy change in this respect. 
While there is a strong economic case for not taking part in incentives-based competition for 
FDI, FDI incentives are politically attractive: Host-country governments can point to visible 
results of their promotional efforts when an FDI project is attracted, whereas the costs of 
incentives are typically widely spread and hardly visible. The built-in bias towards offering 
overly generous FDI incentives is clearly reflected in failed attempts at international policy 
coordination, which seems key to escaping the prisoner's dilemma of host-country authorities 
when MNEs start playing the authorities off against one another to bid up the value of 
incentives. Finally, it would help developing countries very little if only industrialized 
countries were restrained in subsidizing FDI, considering that competition for FDI is mostly 
among relative neighbors (Oman 2001: 65). 
3.  Some Do's and Dont's with Regard to FDI Policies 
Compared to incentives-based competition for FDI in general, it may be easier to observe 
some more specific dont's related to FDI promotion. The recent experience of Latin American 
countries which lured foreign direct investors into privatization programs may offer important 
lessons in this regard. In various instances, governments conceded (too) much to MNEs that 
acquired state-owned assets, mainly in the services sector. In Argentina, foreign providers of 
privatized utilities were relieved from exchange-rate risk by allowing for dollar-denominated 
charges indexed to inflation in the United States. Brazil enticed FDI into electricity generation 
by offering gas supplies at subsidized prices. The recent political backlash against 
privatization in the region appears to be at least partly because such overly generous operation 
contracts did not prevent MNEs from suspending payments or even leaving Latin American 
host countries when economic conditions turned sour, as in Argentina in 2002. 
This strongly suggests that the regulatory framework should be based on a realistic 
cost/benefit calculus of privatization-related FDI. In any case, policymakers should refrain 
from relieving MNEs from business risks such as exchange-rate risk. At the same time, it has 
to be taken into account that the privatization of services such as water and electricity often   5
amounts to creating a private (local) monopoly. Privatization in such areas requires a strong 
and permanent public regulator, especially when powerful MNEs are involved. 
Similar to the earlier euphoria about privatization-related FDI, the current preoccupation of 
policymakers with promoting high-tech FDI appears to be out of proportion, once it is taken 
into account what many developing countries can reasonably expect from FDI in technology 
intensive industries. This is not to ignore that developing host countries with relatively strong 
economic fundamentals, notably in terms of complementary local factors of production, may 
succeed in upgrading FDI inflows through promotional efforts. For example, Costa Rica 
encourages FDI in high-tech industries by offering skilled human resources in combination 
with free-zone incentives. Chile targets high-tech FDI in view of its changing comparative 
advantage, e.g., by subsidizing on-the-job training of workers and providing R&D funds for 
trade-related activities. Even under favorable conditions, however, the question remains 
whether potentially positive externalities of FDI outweigh the costs involved in attracting 
high-tech FDI. 
In less developed countries, the current euphoria about high-tech FDI is clearly misplaced. 
This is for two reasons:2 First, from the distribution of US FDI in developing countries it 
appears that the chances to attract FDI in sophisticated manufacturing such as chemicals, 
machinery and transport equipment are pretty bad for host countries with insufficient 
schooling and poor institutions. Second, the same host-country characteristics render it fairly 
unlikely that FDI in machinery and transport equipment results in higher income growth. This 
is at odds with the hypothesis that a large technological gap between the host country and the 
home country of FDI fosters FDI-induced catching-up processes in developing countries. 
Rather, the interplay of host-country characteristics and industry characteristics reveals that 
positive growth effects of FDI are more likely when the technological gap is relatively small. 
As a consequence, before engaging in the competition for high-tech FDI, policymakers in 
developing countries should undertake a realistic assessment of local capabilities to absorb 
FDI inflows productively. In many developing countries, policymakers are probably well 
advised to spend scarce public resources on improving local capabilities, rather than 
encouraging inflows of high-tech FDI. 
                                                 
2   For details, see Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003).   6
This suggestion is largely in line with the extensive list of policy options, discussed in detail 
by UNCTAD (2001), of how to create and deepen linkages between affiliates of foreign 
MNEs and local suppliers, and, thereby, to derive more benefits from FDI. The policy 
options, summarized in the table below, fall into four broad categories: information and 
matchmaking, technology upgrading, training, and finance: 
•  The measures related to the provision of information and matchmaking are fairly standard. 
They may help overcome information failures and, thus, provide better opportunities for 
linkage creation between foreign affiliates and local suppliers. However, it is not 
necessarily governments that have to provide such services; chambers of commerce and 
industry associations may also assume this role. More importantly, UNCTAD (2001: 175) 
rightly states that "matchmaking cannot remedy supplier weaknesses". 
•  Some of the measures going beyond the provision of information are more controversial. 
This refers in particular to mandatory technology transfers. Apart from being increasingly 
prohibited through bilateral and plurilateral treaties (see Section 2 above), the 
effectiveness of technology-transfer requirements is highly questionable (Moran 1998). 
For example, the much heralded Korean model of technology-transfer requirements was 
discontinued in the late 1980s already. According to UNCTAD (2001: 194), these 
requirements were perceived to be a liability: While some MNEs refrained from FDI in 
Korea altogether, others transferred only out-of-date technologies. 
•  Most of the other measures listed in the table relate to local capacity building, rather than 
representing FDI policies in a narrow sense. This is most evident in the case of training. 
The focus on improving the qualification of the local work force is clearly warranted, in 
the light of the empirical evidence that favorable growth effects of FDI depend on the 
availability of sufficiently skilled labor in the host country (Borensztein et al. 1998). 
Financial measures are mainly thought to ease financial constraints that local suppliers 
may face in the absence of well-functioning domestic capital markets.   7
Table   —  Policy Options for Promoting Linkages 
Information and 
matchmaking 
Technology upgrading  Training  Finance 
•  Handouts and 
brochures 
•  Electronic 
databases 





•  Acting as honest 
broker in 
negotiations 
•  Supporting 
supplier audits 
•  Providing advice 
on subcontracting 
deals 
•  Sponsoring fairs, 
missions, etc. 
•  Organizing 
meetings, visits to 
plants 
•  Technology 
transfer as a 
performance 
requirement 
•  Partnership with 
foreign affiliates 
•  Incentives for 
R&D cooperation 
•  Promoting 
supplier 
associations 
•  Collaboration with 




•  Support for private 
sector training 
programs 
•  Collaboration with 
international 
agencies 






•  Legislation and 
tax measures to 
shorten payment 
delays 
•  Guaranteeing the 
recovery of 
delayed payments 
•  Tax incentives and 
other fiscal 
benefits to firms 
providing long-
term funds to 
suppliers 
•  Co-financing 
development 
programs with the 
private sector 
•  Providing finance 
to local firms 
•  Mandatory 
transfer of funds 
from foreign 
affiliates to local 
suppliers 
 
Source:  Adapted from UNCTAD (2001: 210).   8
In summary, for promoting development-friendly FDI, governments in developing countries 
must no longer concentrate on narrowly defined FDI policies, many of which are ineffective, 
or even counterproductive, unless appropriate local conditions are in place. 
4.   Essential Ingredients of a Broad-based Strategy 
For defining and implementing a broader strategy to foster favorable effects of FDI, 
policymakers in developing countries need to know: (i) the major factors shaping the impact 
of FDI on host-country development, and (ii) the critical bottlenecks in the country they rule. 
As concerns the former, the recent literature on the growth effects of FDI in developing 
countries provides some important insights:3 
•  Better education and training would add to the supply of qualified labor in developing 
host countries and improve prospects to benefit from technology transfers and spillovers. 
•  More sophisticated local financial markets enhance the capacity of host countries to 
absorb FDI inflows. This leads some authors to conclude that developing countries should 
reform their financial systems before liberalizing the capital account to allow for more 
FDI inflows. 
•  Opening up to trade may help become involved in corporate networks and, thereby, to 
benefit from the widely perceived trend towards efficiency-seeking and export-oriented 
FDI. 
•  Institutional development seems to be required to benefit from both efficiency-seeking 
and market-seeking FDI. Institutional development involves a wide range of fairly time-
consuming reforms, including the protection of property rights, control of corruption and 
efficient administrative regulations. 
The crux is that creating a local environment in which FDI is not only profitable for MNEs, 
but also delivers social returns to the host country by contributing to development objectives, 
amounts to a daunting task exactly where development needs are most pressing. But even 
relatively advanced developing countries need a clear understanding of remaining bottlenecks 
to greater benefits from FDI. A detailed account of competitive strengths and weaknesses 
                                                 
3   For an overview and relevant references, see Nunnenkamp (2004).   9
should provide the basis for defining policy priorities. The World Economic Forum’s (2003) 
Global Competitiveness Report offers a reasonable starting point in that regard. This report 
offers a wealth of indicators related to the policy areas mentioned above, and allows 
policymakers to identify where their country stands in the ranking of 80 industrialized 
countries and developing economies. 
Policy priorities may differ considerably from country to country. This applies even to 
countries which, at a first glance, bear close resemblance in terms of attractiveness to FDI, 
growth performance and overall competitiveness. For example, Brazil appears to be better 
placed than Mexico with regard to some complementary factors of production, e.g., the 
innovative capacity of local companies, financial market development and the quality of 
education (Nunnenkamp 2003). On the other hand, Brazil lags considerably behind Mexico 
when it comes to openness to trade, which can be regarded as a precondition for becoming 
involved in international production networks. Hence, Brazil faces different policy challenges, 
e.g., tackling high costs of importing equipment, than Mexico, where education deserves top 
priority. 
Yet there is one thing that almost all elements of a broad-based strategy have in common: 
They are time-consuming to implement, and their pay-off in terms of higher and better FDI is 
unlikely to be visible in the short run. This may explain the preoccupation of many 
policymakers with narrowly defined FDI policies, notably discretionary incentives. From an 
economic point of view, however, it is high time to turn the FDI agenda upside down.   10
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